This is a translation of a Japanese newspaper roundtable discussion from June 1945, held just two months before Imperial Japan’s defeat in World War II. The participants included senior Japanese officials—an army major general, colonial administrators, and publishing executives—as well as Park Chun-geum, a prominent Korean collaborator and former parliamentarian who was highly trusted by the colonial regime.
Despite his reputation, Park offers an unusually lucid view into the mindset of Koreans at the time. He had spoken directly with Korean youth who feared that if Imperial Japan lost, the peninsula would descend into chaos. Multiple foreign powers—the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Nationalists (Chongqing), and pro-Japanese factions—would all try to assert control. Park warns that Koreans would end up fighting each other, and that the only way to prevent this disaster was for Imperial Japan to trust Koreans, give them hope, and reframe the war as a defense of Korea itself.
Park was essentially calling for a redirection of Korean nationalism—not its suppression—toward protecting the homeland by fighting under the Imperial Japanese banner.
But the Japanese participants could not comprehend this, and ignored Park's concerns. They refused to leave their own reality bubble, insisting upon maintaining the ideology of naisen ittai (內鮮一體, Japanese-Korean Unification), which was fundamentally incompatible with permitting Korean nationalism. This meeting is a striking case of hypernormalization—a regime clinging to its official ideology and pretending that business as usual could continue, even as the empire was disintegrating.
What makes this article especially remarkable is that it was published during the final phase of the Battle of Okinawa, with the clear possibility that the Korean peninsula itself could soon become a battlefield. For years, propaganda had vaguely warned that “we will become slaves” if Imperial Japan lost—but here, for the first time, you see detailed, realistic predictions: a fragmented, occupied Korea and internecine warfare. That level of candor—speculation on Imperial Japan’s defeat and Korea’s postwar future—appearing in a Japanese newspaper in 1945 is extraordinary.
Even more striking, the article predicts that Soviet forces would enter Korea, despite the USSR not yet being at war with Imperial Japan at the time. The only real inaccuracy is the assumption that the Chinese Nationalists (referred to as "Chongqing" after their capital) would prevail in China’s civil war. Otherwise, the forecast is hauntingly accurate.
The roundtable also touches on the organization of Korean Volunteer Corps, intended to mobilize civilians—even girls as young as 12—into makeshift militias similar to Germany’s Volkssturm. At this stage in the war, Japanese authorities were already training some Koreans with bamboo spears, preparing them for suicidal banzai charges against Allied forces.
In short, this roundtable reveals a desperate colonial regime completely out of touch with the sentiment of the Korean people, refusing to accept reality, and still insisting on ideological unity while the empire’s collapse was imminent.
[Translation]
Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) June 1, 1945
Expectations for the National Volunteer Corps
(Roundtable hosted by Keijo Nippo newspaper, Part 4)
Resolving Ideological Problems
Instill Political Ideals!
Mr. Park Chun-geum (박춘금, 朴春琴) (former member of the Diet): Until recently, I did not understand the feelings of the Korean youth. However, I sensed something lately and gathered some young people together. I asked them: “What do you think will happen to the Korean peninsula if Japan loses the war? And what will happen if Japan wins?” I asked them to speak frankly. They responded with something interesting:
“If Japan loses, five or six different forces will come into the Korean peninsula—such as the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the Chongqing government, and pro-Japanese elements—splitting into factions and fighting among themselves. The 26 million people on the Korean peninsula will end up killing each other. That would bring the greatest misfortune to the Korean people. Therefore, we hope the Japanese people will fully trust the Koreans and allow us to contribute as well. We would like you, Chun-geum, to convey this message.”
Thus, I believe it is necessary to fully grasp the spirit of the youth. To achieve this, we must provide hope to the Korean people. Up until now, they have been told endlessly to become loyal subjects of the Empire. What is needed now is to give them hope. Entrust the structure of the national body to the Korean people and say, “You can do it. The peninsula is your homeland.”
In short, what is most important at this moment is that the Japanese people sincerely trust the Koreans and give them hope and a sense of cooperation. If we do that, the Korean people will gladly give their lives as Imperial subjects. Also, we must genuinely demonstrate that the motivation behind the Greater East Asia War is the liberation of the peoples of Asia.
I would like to see this kind of roundtable held once more, and with a broader range of participants. I believe it would be extremely effective in stimulating public opinion and providing useful guidance to the authorities.
Mr. Kurashige Shūzō (Imperial Army Major General, Secretary General of the Korea Headquarters of the Patriotic Women's Association): On the 14th, Prime Minister Suzuki clarified the operational policy of the National Volunteer Corps, stating that the Corps’ essential mission is to embody ethical principles and serve the nation.
I have always believed that the foundation of national governance lies in clarifying the national body and rectifying moral principles in order to carry out the war to its conclusion. From this perspective, I believe the National Volunteer Corps should become a central element of current political efforts.
Accordingly, in organizing this system, the government must ensure that its principles are thoroughly understood by the officials directly involved—the heads of provinces, districts (gun), prefectures, towns (eup), and townships (myeon).
Mr. Ishida Kōzō (President of Jinmonsha Publishing): Leaders should be chosen from among the local bosses with real political capability. Ultimately, without political skill, the endeavor will likely fail.
In any undertaking, I believe it is more effective when politically aware people are involved. Organizing a volunteer corps of 26 million requires instilling a political ideal. In order to instill a lofty ideal, political awareness is necessary.
Mr. Park: This is not a time to discuss the grand plans of a hundred years. What matters now is winning the war. To that end, we must secure even greater cooperation from the Korean people. That means giving them hope.
Mr. Matsumura Kōichi (Executive at Korean Aircraft Company, Director at the Ministry of Culture and Information): From what I have heard, two main issues have been raised. One is the matter of political awareness. To be clear, this is an ideological issue. In Korea, a national movement cannot be launched unless the ideological issues are resolved.
Therefore, if a National Volunteer Corps is to be created, we must resolve ideological problems to a certain degree, or else it will be ineffective. I believe no one would disagree with this.
The most solid method would be to resolve these ideological issues and then build the National Volunteer Corps with mainland Japanese at its core and Koreans supporting it.
Mr. Ishida: I fully agree with the first part of what you said. There is no alternative but to resolve Korea’s ideological issues before moving forward.
As for the lingering, unresolved ideological discontent that remains today, I believe it can only be resolved through something like the Volunteer Corps—something combat-oriented. This applies equally to both mainland Japan and Korea. There are unique elements to the complexity of Korea’s ideological issues.
Mr. Matsumura: There is a large qualitative difference between the Korean Volunteer Corps and that of mainland Japan. As for the ideological question, how can it be resolved? If mainland Japan fully trusts the Korean side, and the Korean side fully trusts mainland Japan, then it can be resolved. Achieving that trust will only be possible by fighting the war together. In organizing the Volunteer Corps, I believe Korea’s unique characteristics will naturally emerge.
Mr. Kurashige: The ideological issue is a difficult one, but in our Patriotic Women's Association, for example, when we gather and talk a few times, no real problems arise.
In other words, mutual understanding leads to resolution. If we develop close relationships with each other, we will understand one another. In that case, the concept of Japanese-Korean unification becomes a non-issue.
Mr. Yokomizo (President of Keijo Nippo newspaper): We are truly honored to have gathered you all here today—individuals with rich experience, deep insight, and aspirations regarding the national movement—to provide frank and unreserved opinions about the organization of the National Volunteer Corps.
For our newspaper, which bears the serious responsibility of guiding public opinion, today’s discussion was highly informative. Above all, all policy measures today must focus on winning this war. Therefore, even if a new structure for the National Volunteer Corps is established, it must ultimately aim to achieve maximum effectiveness for victory. All specific strategies must therefore be directed toward this objective.
(End)
[Transcription]
京城日報 1945年6月1日
国民義勇隊に期待する(本社主催座談会4)
思想問題の解決
政治的理念を持たせよ
朴春琴氏(元代議士):私は此の頃の半島青年の気持というものを知らなかった。ところが最近感ずるところがあって青年を集めて私は大体こういうことをいった。『日本が戦に負けたら半島の運命はどうなるか。それから日本が戦に勝ったら朝鮮の運命はどうか』、こういうことで忌憚なく話してくれといった。すると面白いことをいっていた。『日本が負ければ今度は半島には五つも六つもの勢力が入って来る。例えば米英とかソ連とか重慶とか或は親日とかそういうような分子に分れてお互いに闘争する。そうすると二千六百万がお互いに殺しっこをやる。こうなったら半島人は最も大いなる不幸に陥る。故に我々はこう考える日本人が全面的に朝鮮人を信頼して我々にも働かせて貰いたい。そのことを春琴さんから話してくれ』、とそういうことをいっていた。
そこで青年達の魂というものを相当掴む必要があると思う。それがためには何とか半島人に希望を与えなくてはならぬ。今まで単に、お前たちは皇国臣民になれということを耳にタコが出来る程いわれている。そこで希望を与えることだ。今度の国体も半島人に委してお前達がやるのだ。半島はお前達の郷里だという風にやる。何といってもこの際は内地人が大きな気持で半島人を信頼して希望を持たして協力せよというならば、半島人は喜んで皇国臣民として命も捨てる気になる。そして日本民族が大東亜戦争を起した動機はアジア民族の解放にあるのだということを本当に示してやる。
今日のような会をもう一回やってほしい。そして出席者の範囲をもっと広くしてやってほしい。そしたら当局の参考に与論の振起に非常に効果があると思う。
倉茂周蔵氏(陸軍少将、日婦朝鮮本部事務総長):十四日に鈴木首相は国民義勇隊の運営方針を明らかにされたが、国民義勇隊員は道義をもって国民を貫くことをもって本義と致すものであるといわれた。私は国政の基本は国体を明かにし名分を正し、もって戦争を完遂するにあると常々考えているのであるが、この国民義勇隊はこの意味から申しても今日の政治の要点になるべきものであると思う。
従ってこの組織に当っては政府側においても直接その衝に当る道、郡、府、邑、面、等の長に対してよく其の趣旨を徹底せしめられたい。
石田耕造氏(人文社社長):指導者は一地方の親分で政治的能力のある人物を選ぶがよい。要するに政治的能力乃至手腕の少ない人はどうもうまく行かないのではないかと思う。何事にもこの運動の展開には政治性を持つ方が効果がありはしないかと思う。二千六百万で義勇隊を組織するということは矢張りそこに政治的理念を持たせる方がよいのではないか。高い理念を持たせるには結局政治性を持たせなくてはならんと思う。
朴氏:百年の大計を今日論ずるのではない。勝てばよいのである。それがためには半島人として一層協力せしむることである。それには希望を与えることが必要であると思う。
松村紘一氏(朝鮮飛行機重役、文報理事):色々お話を承ったが、要するに問題は二つ提出されていると思う。政治性という問題、これをハッキリ申し上げると思想問題であって結局朝鮮では国民運動は思想問題を解決してからでないと出来ない訳だから、国民義勇隊をつくるならば思想問題にある程度解決を与えないと実効がない。これは何人も異存のないことと思う。そこでこの思想問題を解決して国民義勇隊というものを内地人を中心にしてつくり半島人の方でついていくという方法が一番堅実ではないかと思う。
石田氏:只今のお話の前半には全く賛成である。朝鮮の思想問題を解決して然る後にやる外ないと思う。
今日なお残っている釈然たらざる思想的不満は何によって解決するかということ、これは義勇隊的なそういう戦闘的なものでないと解決出来ないと思う。これは内地側においても朝鮮側においても同じである。朝鮮の思想問題の難しさは独特のものがあると思う。
松村氏:朝鮮の義勇隊と内地側とでは非常に質的に差異があると思う。それから思想問題だが、これをどういう方法で解決するかといえば、内地側は朝鮮側を全面的に信頼し、朝鮮側は内地側を全面的に信頼すれば解決する訳である。これをやることは一緒に戦争をやる外はないと思う。義勇隊組織ということについては朝鮮の特性というものが現れて来ると思う。
倉茂氏:思想問題ということについては難しい問題だが私の方の婦人会等でも二三回集って話をすると結局何も問題は起こらない。つまりよく諒解し合うからである。お互いに親しくすればよく判ることで内鮮一体も何もないと思う。
横溝社長:国民運動について豊富な御経験、御識見また御抱負をもっていられる皆さん方のお集まりを戴き当面の国民義勇隊の組織に関して、最も忌憚のない批判を仰ぎましたことは私共の誠にしあわせとするところです。
与論指導に重大使命を持っている本社としては大変よい参考と相なった訳です。何といっても今日のすべての施策はこの戦争に戦い勝つということに集中しなければならぬ。
この故に、将来つくられる国民義勇隊の新機構といっても結局は勝つために最大の効率を発揮させなければならないのである。従ってそれぞれの具体的な方策はこの目標に集中せられることと思う(終り)。
Source: National Library of Korea, Digital Newspaper Archive