In 1945, Imperial Japan trained almost every able-bodied Korean man, woman, and child to stab Americans to death with bamboo spears in suicide combat militias under direct Imperial Army command

Let's look at three articles from Keijo Nippo (the official Japanese colonial newspaper in Korea) published in April through August 1945 which give a chilling window into how Imperial Japan prepared the Korean population for what they saw as an inevitable final battle on the Korean Peninsula. Almost every Japanese and Korean man, woman, and even child was expected to receive training in bamboo spear techniques and was subjected to intense anti-American propaganda designed to mentally prepare them to fight and kill Allied soldiers without hesitation. The message was clear: they were to sacrifice their lives if necessary, but not before taking at least one Allied soldier with them in the process.

Korean civilians training in bamboo spears at Sunrin Commercial School in Seoul

The first article, published on April 28, 1945, describes a scene at Sunrin Commercial School in Seoul where civilians — many likely conscripted against their will — are shown training with bamboo spears under cherry blossoms. Similar drills were almost certainly taking place all over Korea as well as mainland Japan as the authorities sought to raise a Volunteer Corps of civilians, organized into improvised militias directly controlled by the Imperial Army. The hierarchical command structure of the Volunteer Corps would later be finalized in July 1945 with great fanfare by the top brass of the Imperial Army and the Governor-General's Office. This system was much like the Volkssturm militias of Nazi Germany in its final months. 

The second article, published on June 13, 1945, explains how the Volunteer Corps were also tasked with providing logistical support (intelligence, transportation, communications) to the Imperial Army. But it emphasizes that these transport units were expected to convert into combat units at a moment’s notice, and become farm workers when needed. The article even gives an example of how an activation order might be announced by radio. Those judged to have special aptitude would be organized into guerrilla units to carry out guerrilla warfare.

The third article, published on August 4, 1945, reinforces this point: even transport volunteers driving ox-and-horse carts were expected to instantly mobilize into combat units.

Elsewhere in the same newspaper in June and July 1945, there were instructions on how to fight tanks with hand grenades, how to dig trenches for combat, and other military tactics. This dissemination of military knowledge to the general population was intended to create a mass resistance against Allied invasion. Yet ironically, it had an unforeseen consequence. When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, this same population — already mentally prepared for armed struggle — rose up in various armed uprisings, as seen in incidents across Korea in the immediate post-war period. This outcome reveals a cognitive blind spot of the Japanese military leadership: they failed to consider what would happen after their defeat, and as a result, they unwittingly planted the seeds of armed resistance against themselves.

[Translation]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) April 28, 1945

A Bamboo Spear That Flashes in an Instant to Defend the Divine Land of Japan
The Sword of Wrath That Strikes to Kill
Under the Cherry Blossoms – Homeland Defense Troops Train with Bamboo Spears

In this campaign of tremendous bloodshed, the vile enemy, though distressed by the depletion of its forces, continues to press on toward a final decisive battle. That indomitable will to fight is none other than the treacherous ambition to trample our homeland into complete ruin.

Anticipating an enemy landing on the mainland, the hundred million citizens must literally arm themselves to the last man and woman and protect this Imperial land, unsullied by defilement. Each of us, man or woman, must with certainty kill at least one enemy, stop the breath of the foe, and secure final victory.

Those without weapons shall take up bamboo spears and fight to the bitter end. Let us wield the deadly bamboo spear and fall together with the enemy in mutual destruction. The call for universal armament of our hundred million must not remain empty words.

Here, on the grounds of Sunrin Commercial School, the gentle spring breeze is broken daily by the fierce bamboo spear training of the Homeland Defense Troops.

Should the filthy barbarians invade our land, we shall pierce through the chests of the Americans with a single thrust. Burning with this resolute fighting spirit, about two hundred leaders of the Homeland Defense Troops and various government offices and companies have, since the 26th, gathered under the fully blooming cherry blossoms for three days of instruction in bayonet techniques and bamboo spear training. From morning till evening, they continue intense training under the guidance of their instructors, starting with basic movements.

This is not training for the sake of training. Even the dummy targets used for thrusting practice are unlike those of the past. They represent the targets of those who, aflame with righteous anger, stand in defense of the Imperial land unto death.

The day will surely come when these bamboo spears will be dyed with the blood of our hated enemies. Within the flash of each thrust surges the very soul of our divine nation’s defense.

If there is no bamboo, wood will do. Thrust, thrust, and thrust again — that is the bamboo spear spirit. We asked Second Lieutenant Kawabata, the instructor, to speak:

“Until now, training of this type has been nothing but talk, and there has been no true effort to practice it. People do not even know how to handle wooden rifles, yet they are told to arm themselves completely — that can no longer be allowed. We must abandon the attitude of relying on reinforcements to come. Instead, every single citizen must cultivate their own actual fighting ability. In preparation for emergency, it is absolutely essential to master the handling of weapons that can replace the bayonet when fighting the enemy — that is, the bamboo spear. Doing so is nothing other than the true expression of the spirit to defend the Imperial land to the end.

If there is no bamboo, wood will do. The standard length is from 1 meter 70 centimeters to about 2 meters. The method of handling is no different from bayonet technique. Let us wield our bamboo spears, become a national corps of attackers, and burn with a fierce determination to drive out and slay every last one of the foul invaders.”

[Photo: Training of the Homeland Defense Troops with spears]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) June 13, 1945

What Are the National Volunteer Combat Units?
Divided by Workplace and Region
No Ranks Except for the Commander

The National Volunteer Military Service Act, submitted to the 87th Wartime Diet, passed both the House of Peers and the House of Representatives and has been enacted. This military service law provides the legal foundation for the National Volunteer Corps, which has already been organized nationwide, to be transformed into combat units when the time comes. With the enactment of this military service law, the entire population will greet the enemy landing on the homeland, and all will become soldiers, directly or indirectly joining the frontlines of exterminating the enemy. Thus, the unprecedented realization of complete and thorough universal conscription has been achieved.

The specific details of this military service law will be announced as Imperial ordinances as needed and promptly implemented. The general outline, as clarified through Diet debates, is as follows:

Relationship with the Volunteer Corps:
When the National Volunteer Corps is transformed into combat units, they will be mobilized under this military service law and become volunteer soldiers.

Timing, order, and method of forming combat units:
The order to form combat units will be issued by army district commanders with permission from the Army and Navy Ministers. At present, it is expected that transportation and communication institutions will be among the first to receive immediate orders to form such units. Their employees will become volunteer soldiers upon the issuance of the order, and their peacetime organizational structures will remain intact as combat units. However, their actual operations will be under the direction and supervision of the relevant minister in charge.

Similarly, important factories that are likely to become targets of air raids will also be ordered to form combat units. In these cases, the existing factory organization will become the combat unit, with the company president or factory manager serving as the commander. This is not an official government position.

The above pertains to workplace-based volunteer units that will soon be implemented. As for regional units, in areas where enemy invasion is deemed imminent, orders for formation will be issued individually as needed. For example, in cases where air raids intensify and suspicion of an invasion grows stronger, such orders will be given.

Method of mobilization:
The simplest possible method will be used, primarily verbal orders. For example, a radio broadcast might declare, “The National Volunteer Corps of XX Prefecture, XX Town shall be transformed into combat units,” thereby ordering the formation. In other words, this formation order itself constitutes the call-up, so no written call-up notices will be issued.

Demobilization:
Demobilization will similarly be communicated via radio or verbal announcements.

Organizational structure:
Combat units will be organized at the city, town, village, and major workplace level. These entities must maintain a roster of all affiliated volunteer members.

Status and duties of combat unit members:
The combat units are divided into two categories — workplace-based and regional — but their status is the same. Except for the commander, there are no ranks among the volunteer soldiers. The commander is appointed by the military. In essence, everyone is treated as a private soldier.

The duties differ depending on the reason for formation, but they primarily involve rear-area duties for the military: logistics, intelligence, communications, maintenance of airfields and roads, and so on. Workplace-based production combat units will continue production activities until the very end. During busy agricultural seasons, units will be suitably formed to assist in farming villages, becoming food production combat units as needed. Thus, combat units may also be mobilized as labor reinforcements.

Training:
Training of combat unit members will vary depending on their assigned duties. Some will be specially selected to form assault or raiding units, engaging in bold guerrilla warfare alongside Imperial army soldiers. Since the assigned duties — such as maintaining roads, airfields, transport, and communications — are generally predetermined, training will focus only on what is necessary for these tasks.

In the case of production (factories), production itself is regarded as a combat mission, so there is no need for bamboo spear training. The military's emphasis for training is on spiritual education. The principle is to cultivate a single, elite capability for the assigned task. There is no need for unnecessary training in various areas — the key is to perform the assigned task excellently. Training time should be minimized and used efficiently. Particularly emphasized is the development of integrated training methods where training and production are one and the same.

Command structure:
This will be clarified by imperial ordinance, but apart from railways and communications, regional combat units will be organized by town or village, and a joint combat unit will be established under military control. Command authority lies with the military commander of the relevant area.

Age and other requirements:
Because combat units require mental and physical strength, the upper age limits have been lowered by five years from the Volunteer Corps limits: men up to 60 years old, women up to 40 years old. Previously, the limits were men up to 65 years old, women up to 45 years old. However, those outside these age limits may join as volunteers.

Exemptions:
Those already conscripted, enlisted, ill, pregnant women, women who have given birth, their protective personnel, and others deemed irreplaceable by the regiment district commander will be exempt. In short, all who are capable of working will become combat unit members.

Rewards and punishments:
Combat unit members are treated as soldiers under military discipline. They are eligible for decorations just like regular soldiers, including the Order of the Golden Kite, and will be enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. Punishments will be applied with leniency, without referral to military tribunals under the Army and Navy Acts.

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) August 4, 1945

Robust Independent Volunteer Corps
Transport Units Are Formed
Motor Vehicle and Ox-and-Horse Cart Units to Set Out Soon

The National Volunteer Corps on the Korean Peninsula, preparing heroically for the decisive battle on the homeland, is advancing boldly. In the event of an emergency, overland transport will be of utmost importance. In particular, for small-scale transport operations such as motor vehicles and ox-and-horse carts, excluding Central Region Korean Railway, the Governor-General’s Office has decided to form National Volunteer Transport Units to establish an active operational posture under perfect, unbroken control.

These transport units will be divided into two parts: the National Volunteer Motor Vehicle Unit and the National Volunteer Small Transport Unit composed of ox-and-horse carts. The motor vehicle unit will have its headquarters at the Motor Vehicle Control Company, with battalions assigned to each province.

The small transport unit will have headquarters in each province, battalions at each police station, companies at each police outpost, and beneath them, platoons and squads. The members of these units will not be incorporated into workplace-based or regional National Volunteer Corps units.

These will function as independent, cooperative volunteer units that, upon the issuance of an order, can be converted into combat units.

Regarding the management of these most vital transport units, the Governor-General’s Office convened transport and security section chiefs from each province on the fourth and fifth of this month to hold planning and coordination meetings for operational command.

[Transcription]

京城日報 1945年4月28日

一瞬閃く神州護持の竹槍
怒る必刺の剣
桜花の下・郷軍竹槍訓練

夥しい出血作戦に醜敵は兵力の損耗に焦慮しながらも最後の決戦を挑みつづける。その侮り難き戦意は飽くまでも本土を蹂躙しつくそうとする不逞な野望に他ならぬ。

本土上陸を予測して一億は文字通り総武装し汚されたことなき皇土を護持、男も女も必ずや一人一殺をもって敵の息の根を止め最後の勝利を獲得せねばならぬ。

武器なきものは竹槍をとっても戦い抜こう。必殺の竹槍をふるって敵と刺し違えようではないか。

一億皆武装も口先だけではいけない。ここ善隣商業学校校内では春風駘蕩の麗らかさを破って毎日烈しい郷軍の竹槍訓練が行われている。

一たび醜夷わが国土に侵犯せばこの一突をもってメリケンの胸板を貫かんの満々たる闘魂に燃ゆる郷軍はじめ各官衙会社の指導者二百名達は二十六日から三日間に亘ってらんまんの桜花の下で銃剣道と竹槍訓練の講習に参加し、終日、教官の指導のもとに基本動作から火の出るような訓練を続けている。

訓練のための訓練ではない。刺突する仮標もまたこれまでの仮標とは違う。怒りに燃えた皇土死守の姿である。

この竹槍がやがて怨敵の血で染まる時が来るであろう。されば一閃する刺突の中に神州護持の魂魄が奔流するのだ。竹槍がなくば木でもよい。突いて突いて突きまくる竹槍精神を、教官川畑少尉に語って貰った。

『今までこの種の訓練は口ばかりであり、実際にやるということがなかったようだ。木銃の持ち方も知らなくて総武装せよなどというのはもう今ではいけない。待つあるを恃むの戦闘態勢から国民の一人一人が残らず実力を培養して置くことである。有事の際を覚し敵と戦う銃剣に代わるべき武器、即ち竹槍などの操方は絶対に身につけて置くことが真剣に皇土を護り抜く精神の発露に他ならない。竹がなくば木でもよい。長さは一米七十糎から二米位が標準である。その操方は銃剣道と変りない。竹槍をふるい、国民総斬込隊となって醜賊を一人残らず撃ち攘う烈々の気概に燃えねばならぬ』

【写真＝郷軍の槍訓練】

京城日報 1945年6月13日

国民義勇戦闘隊とは
職域と地域に区分
隊長を除き階級なし

第八十七敵前議会に提出された国民義勇兵役法案は貴衆両院を通過成立した。この兵役法は全国的にほぼ組織を終った国民義勇隊が戦闘隊となるべき時の法的根拠をなすもので、全国民はこの兵役法の制定によって敵を本土に邀え、悉くが一兵卒となって直接間接滅敵の第一線に参加することになり、史上その比を見ない完全かつ徹底した国民皆兵の姿がここに実現するに至った。この兵役法の具体的諸点は今後その都度勅令によって公示され、速やかに実施されるが、議会において論議され明かとなった諸点を通じその大体の輪郭を示せば次の通りである。

義勇隊との関係：国民義勇隊が戦闘隊に転移すればこの兵役法によって召集され義勇兵となる。

戦闘隊編成の時期、順序、方法：戦闘隊に編成される命令は陸海軍大臣の許可を得て各軍管区司令官が下令する。現在のところ直ちに編成下令されるものと予想されるものには運輸、通信機関がある。これらの従業員は下令次第全部義勇兵となり、平時の組織そのままで戦闘隊となるわけである。しかし実際の業務はその斯管大臣の指揮監督を受くることとなる。これについて編成下令されるものに空襲目標となる重要工場がある。この場合も工場の組織そのままが戦闘隊となる。社長、工場長が隊長となり指揮することとなるが、これは官職ではない。

以上は近く実施される職域義勇隊の場合であるが、地域的には敵の侵攻間近しと判断される地区について個々に必要に応じて編成下令が下ることになっている。たとえば空襲が激化し、その侵攻の疑い濃厚となった場合など下令せられることとなろう。召集の方法は最も簡易を選び口頭でやることを原則としている。たとえばラジオ放送を利用して『〇〇県〇〇町国民義勇隊は戦闘隊に転移すべし』と下令し、編成を命ずる。すなわち、この編成下令が義勇召集を意味するものであるから召集令状は出さないことになっている。

解除の場合もまた同様ラジオや口頭などで伝達される。戦闘隊の軍位は市、町、村および主要職域団体でこれらの機関では所属義勇隊員の連名簿を作って置くことが必要である。

戦闘隊員の身分、任務、戦闘隊は以下の如く職域、地域と二つに区分されているが、その身分は同じである。義勇兵には隊長を除き階級はない。隊長は軍が命ずる。すなわち全部が一兵卒というわけである。

任務は編成の理由によって異なって来るが、主として軍の後方勤務、兵站、情報、連絡、飛行場、道路の補修等に従事する。また職域で最後まで生産に邁進する生産戦闘隊は農繁期に適当に編成されて農村に出動する。食糧増産戦闘隊となることもある。このように戦闘隊は場合により労務の補充として召集されることもあり得るのである。

戦闘隊の訓練：戦闘隊員の訓練は与えられた任務により色々違って来るが、中には特に選ばれて斬込み挺身隊となり、皇軍将兵と共に果敢なゲリラ戦を専門にやるものもあるが、道路、飛行場の補修輸送、連絡等と平素から大体与えられる任務がきまっているから訓練にはそれに必要な訓練をやる。

生産（工場）：戦闘隊は生産それ自体が戦闘任務であるから竹槍訓練等は勿論やる必要もない。軍の予定している訓練の重点は精神教育であり、特に与えられる任務に対し単一精鋭なることを原則としている。従ってあれもこれもやる必要はない。つまり与えられた一つの任務を立派にやればよい。訓練には余計な時間をさかず、出来るだけ短い時間を活用してやる。特に訓練即生産ともいうべき生産と一体的な訓練方法を工夫することが強調されている。

命令系統構成：これは勅令で明かにされるが鉄道、通信は別として地区戦闘隊は町村を単位とし軍に聯合戦闘隊を設ける。これらの指揮権は当該地区の軍司令官にある。

年齢其の他：戦闘隊は気力体力を要するので年齢は義勇隊の男六十五歳、女四十五歳から各五歳切り下げられ、男六十、女四十なでと定められている。しかして年齢外のものでも志願によって戦闘隊に加わることが出来る。除外例としては応召、入営者、病人、妊産婦その保護要員及びその他聯隊区司令官が余人を以て換えられないと認めるものであるが、要するに働けるものの総てが戦闘隊員になるわけである。

賞罰：戦闘隊員は義勇兵であるから軍紀の下に軍人として待遇される。行賞は勿論一般軍人と同じで金鵄勲章も授賜され、靖国神社に祀られる。罰は陸海軍法会議に附することなく緩和して適用されることとなっている。

京城日報 1945年8月4日

逞し独立義勇隊
輸送隊を編成
自動車、牛馬者両隊近く発進

本土決戦に備える半島の国民義勇隊は勇壮に進発しているが、有事の場合最も重要である陸上輸送、就中鮮鉄を除いた自動車、牛馬車等の小運送部門に対し、総督府は国民義勇輸送隊を編成し、一糸紊れざる統制下に活発なる活動態勢を整備することになった。

此輸送隊は国民義勇自動車隊と牛馬車を打って一丸とする国民義勇小運搬隊に分れ自動車隊は自動車統制会社に本部を置き各道に大隊をおくことになっている。小運搬隊は各道に本部、各警察署に大隊、駐在所に中隊を置き、其下に小隊、分隊を置き、これらの隊員は職域、地域の義勇隊には編入されない。

単独協力なる義勇隊とし一度命下れば戦闘隊に切り替えられるものである。此最も重要なる輸送隊の運営に付、総督府は四、五の両日各道輸送保安課長を召集、運営指揮の打合せを行う。

Source: National Library of Korea, Digital Newspaper Archive

See also: (June 17, 1945 Q and A regarding mass mobilization): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2023/10/in-june-1945-imperial-japan-announced.html

February 1943 news article of British prisoners of war interviewed by their Imperial Army captors in Keijo (Seoul) POW camp

This is a news article from February 1943, published in Keijo Nippo newspaper, an organ of the Imperial Japanese colonial regime which ruled Korea from 1905 to 1945, featuring an interview with British Prisoners of War who were held captive in Seoul (then called Keijo in Japanese) during World War II. For this post, I co-partnered with Richard Baker, an independent researcher who is currently writing a book on the experiences of the POWs who were shipped to Korea for propaganda purposes. He also has a Master's by Research postgraduate thesis on Keijo camp which can be found at this link: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/72789/

[Translation]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) February 15, 1943

The Day Singapore Fell

Listening to the British Prisoners of War

The Superior Attack of the Imperial Army

Deep Gratitude for their Fair Treatment

The Dawn of Greater East Asia. It has been a year since Singapore, the proud bastion of the British invasion of East Asia, fell on that significant day in history. On February 15, 1942, at 7 PM, our General Yamashita met with the enemy General Percival. With decisive words from General Yamashita demanding a "Yes or No" answer, Percival signed the unconditional surrender at 7:50 PM with his trembling hand. The fierce battle for Singapore, breaking through the jungle and trudging through the mud, ceased here. This day is celebrated as "The Fall of Singapore".

The interviewed British Prisoners of War:

• Commander of the 2nd Battalion, Loyal Regiment: Colonel Elrington (age 45)
• Company Commander of the same, Major Leighton (age 33)
• Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, Captain Paque (age 36)
• Attached Warrant Officer of the 3rd Company: Moffat (age 39)
• Mortar Company Sergeant and Platoon Leader: Sergeant Strange (age 29)
• Platoon Leader of the 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, Loyal Regiment: Lance Corporal Ankers (age 31)

Q: When did you start preparing for defense on the Malay Peninsula? And how long did you think Singapore would hold out?

Colonel Elrington: My battalion was transferred from Shanghai to Singapore on April 6, 1938. We thought Singapore would hold out forever.

Q: Can a non-commissioned officer become a platoon leader in the British Army?

Sergeant Strange: Normally, it is an officer's position, but when my unit moved to Malaya, our platoon leader was injured, so I took over.

Q: Where were you captured during battle?

Captain Paque: We were not captured. We were told by Commander Percival to lay down our arms.

Q: Where were you at that time?

Captain Paque: I was in the Gilman Barracks in the Alexander area.

Q: How was the battle against the Japanese forces?

Colonel Elrington: On February 8th and 9th, the Japanese attacked from the northeast and northwest, but we didn't know where the attack would come from. There were no defense facilities on the west coast before the war. The Australian and Indian troops confronted the Japanese here, and after two days, we were pushed back to Bukit Timah. Our battalion was ordered to move from our barracks to Bukit Timah on the 10th, and we held our position near Bukit Timah until the night of the 12th. On the 12th, we saw Japanese troops breaking through the jungle and moving behind us. These Japanese troops were excellent soldiers.

On the 13th, we received orders to retreat to Buonavista, and that night we fell back to Alexander Road. At that time, the Japanese army was advancing rapidly along roads of Bukit Timah with tanks and infantry. On the 14th and 15th, our battalion defended the Gilman Barracks while being attacked by Japanese artillery and from the air. This battle was the closest we had fought.

We were astonished by the fierce attack of the Japanese. There were bayonet charges by Major Leighton (2nd Company) and Warrant Officer Moffat (attached to the 3rd Company) until the evening of the 14th, but against the Japanese charging with bayonets, our team could only counter with machine guns. No matter how much we shot, the Japanese soldiers kept coming like little demons. It felt like they were not human. In this fierce battle, only a few members of our 2nd and 3rd companies survived.

Our battalion's left wing had a Malay battalion. The Japanese broke through there and took control of the sea near the left wing. I had to order the next line of defense to be set up on Washington Hill as the battalion commander. This was between 2 and 3 PM on the 15th. At 8 PM, we received an order from General Percival for everyone to surrender. The next day, a Japanese officer came and praised the Loyal Regiment for its bravery.

Captain Paque: Our first encounter with the Japanese army was on January 14 in Segamat. We were bombed, but it was not a battle, we retreated. The Japanese Army we were facing at that time had beautifully broken through the rubber plantations and the jungle, coming around the sea to our rear.

Colonel Elrington: In the battle at Payong, between Muar and Yong Peng, seven Japanese tanks appeared, and the infantry advanced.

Major Leighton: The Japanese tanks broke through the normal barbed wire and anti-tank mine obstacles, but there was no engagement, and we retreated on that day.

Warrant Officer Moffat: We could never predict the actions of the Japanese army; they always came around from behind, forcing us to retreat. The Japanese Army was very good at mobile operations.

Colonel Elrington: We had lost 40% of our soldiers by the time we retreated to Singapore. We arrived in Singapore by truck on the 26th and were re-equipped as a reinforcement unit.

Warrant Officer Moffat: When crossing Johor, we had not yet seen the Japanese army.

Q: How did you feel when Singapore fell?

Colonel Elrington: I was surprised when I received the order to surrender. We did not anticipate this. We had fought with all our might, but there was no choice once the order was received.

Q: How did you feel when you heard that the Japanese army had landed in Singapore?

Colonel Elrington: I expected it at that time.

Captain Paque: We were prepared to fight until we were all killed, but there was no choice once the order was received.

Q: What do you think was the cause of the fall of Singapore?

Colonel Elrington: The facilities for defense against attacks from the north were not sufficient. Singapore was defended facing the southern sea. Also, the air force was very weak. The direct cause of the surrender was "to avoid civilian casualties and destruction of the city, as the Japanese army had taken control of the water supply," as General Percival said.

Lance Corporal Ankers: The Japanese army was numerically superior, and their air bombing was skilled; we were just defending our position.

Sergeant Strange: I was injured in the hand by a rifle bullet during the battle at the Gilman Barracks. I still have that bullet as a souvenir.

Colonel Elrington: The Japanese army was good at mobile operations like breaking through the jungle and attacking unexpectedly.

Q: So, are you saying that the Japanese Army's attack through the jungle and mud, striking from unexpected places, was ungentlemanly?

Colonel Elrington: No, no, that is not the case. In our army, the motto is "All is fair in love and war." The Japanese Army's attack was excellent.

Q: Colonel Elrington, what was the last order that you gave to your subordinates?

Colonel Elrington: I ordered each company to pile up their weapons and wait for orders from the Japanese Army, and I gave the following message to everyone: "I am pleased that you have fought very well. We surrender not because of your mistakes, but because of orders. Remember your comrades who showed duty and discipline in death and defeat. Do not disgrace the honor of the Loyal Regiment even as prisoners of war." Currently, we do not harbor any hostility towards Japan as soldiers.

Warrant Officer Moffat: All of us are grateful for our fair treatment by the Japanese Army.

【Censored by the Korean Military】

[Background Notes]

Prisoners of War served two functions for the Japanese: they provided slave labor, and they were exploited for propaganda. Prime Minister Tojo decreed that POWs would be located across Japanese territories to establish confidence in a Japanese victory amongst the local populations and to eradicate any lingering sense of western superiority amongst the people. A group of about 1000 POWs were sent to Korea for this purpose. But prisoners could serve another propaganda purpose, by providing accounts of Japanese military successes. As soon as the prisoners arrived in Korea, they were interviewed by reporters who wanted to hear all about their defeat in Malaya.

The account of the Malayan campaign and the Fall of Singapore in the newspaper article is based on a substratum of truth overlaid with Japanese inventions. The prisoners they interviewed were members of the 2nd Battalion, Loyal Regiment, who had been stationed at Singapore since 1938. In the interview, their senior officer, Colonel ‘Bill’ Elrington rightly admits that the northern defences on Singapore island were inadequate, and that the Japanese were more mobile than the forces under the command of Percival. Most of the British and Dominion troops lacked training in jungle warfare and were constantly outflanked by the Japanese, who made rapid progress down the Malayan peninsula. He also states, correctly, that the Japanese were able to establish air superiority from the early days of the fighting, and this was a significant contributory factor in the Japanese victory. Elrington’s men fought bravely and were indeed congratulated by their opponents immediately after the capitulation. But they suffered heavy losses: the total of 40% given by Elrington is possibly an under-estimate. The bayonet charges mentioned in the article are fictitious, although the Japanese troops did use bayonets in the last days of fighting, when they killed approximately 200 patients and staff in Alexandra Military hospital.

The interviewees would never had said that they felt 'deep gratitude' towards their captors: this is a trope of Japanese POW propaganda, nor would they have articulated the overly effusive praises for the Japanese soldiers that are attributed to them. Nevertheless, the reported words of the prisoners offer a real sense of the speaker's personality: something of Captain Paque's pugnacious and combative attitude towards his captors is seen when he tells the interviewers that the Loyals did not surrender of their own volition, but were ordered to, and were ready to fight to the death. What the article misses is that the men they interviewed all believed that the defeat was the result of poor leadership from the Commander-in-chief, Lieutenant General Percival and his senior staff. Later, it would be accepted that both the British armed forces and the British government had been complacent and wrongly assumed that they would be technologically and militarily superior to any Japanese fighting forces that dared to attack Singapore.

The prisoners were held at Keijo, a show camp, where visits by the Red Cross were manipulated to suggest that Japan was treating its captives fairly. Consequently, conditions in the camp were as good as in any Japanese POW camp. But the prisoners were regularly beaten, and lived on the verge of starvation. They suffered from diseases caused by malnutrition, the unhygienic living conditions and inadequate protection from the cold. At the time of the interview, Colonel Elrington was suffering from acute bronchitis which he had developed during the harsh Korean winter; his lungs never recovered. In 1945, the camp no longer served a useful propaganda purpose and Elrington was informed that, like the prisoners in the other camps in Korea, he and his men would all be executed in the event of a Russian or American invasion. Only the Japanese surrender prevented this.

The following is an excerpt from the diary of a fellow POW, A. V. Toze, which was at the Imperial War Museum in London:

February 12th 1943

Stan [Strange] together with Colonel E.[Elrington] and others were hailed to press conference ‘Office’ at 2pm and were interviewed by a host of reporters about fighting in Malaya.

They wanted to know why so many surrendered, were disappointed to learn that there were no bayonet fights, couldn’t understand ‘all’s fair in love and war’, the answer given to question ‘Did we consider the Japanese soldiers’ methods honourable?’

Colonel Elrington

Propaganda photo taken at camp cemetery, 1944. Captain Paque is standing far left of the picture, and Colonel Elrington is behind him, slightly to the right

More photos of Colonel Elrington and other fellow prisoners of war, including Captain Paque and Major Leighton

[Transcription]

京城日報 1943年2月15日

シンガポール崩るるの日

在鮮英俘虜にきく

優秀な皇軍の攻撃

正遇に心から感謝

大東亜の黎明。英国が東亜侵略の牙城として世界に誇ったシンガポールが陥落して一周年。大いなる歴史の日。昭和十七年二月十五日午後七時、わが山下将軍と敵将パーシバルと会見。”イェス”か”ノー”か断乎たる山下将軍の一声にパーシバルが震える手で無条件降伏に署名したのが同五十分ジャングルを突破し泥濘を踏み越え凄絶極まるシンガポール攻略戦はここに停戦したのだ。この日”祝シンガポール陥落”。

語る英軍俘虜：

• ローヤル聯隊第二大隊長：中佐エリントン（四五）
• 同第二中隊長少佐：ライトン（三三）
• 同第二大隊副官大尉：ペイク（三六）
• 同第三中隊附属准尉：モファット（三九）
• 迫撃砲中隊小隊長軍曹：ストレンジ（二九）
• ローヤル聯隊第二大隊第一中隊分隊長兵長：アンカース（三一）

問：マレー半島の防備には何時から就いたか？またシンガポールは何時までもちこたえると思っていたのか？

エリントン中佐：自分の大隊は一九三八年四月六日上海からシンガポールに移駐したのである。シンガポールは永久に持ちこたえると思っていた。

問：英軍は下士官でも小隊長になれるのか？

ストレンジ軍曹：普通は将校であるが、自分の隊はマレーに進んだ時、小隊長が負傷したので自分が代ったわけだ。

問：何処の戦闘で俘虜になったか？

ペイク大尉：自分達は捕らえられたのではない。パーシバル司令官から武器を捨てるようにいわれたのだ。

問：その時は何処に居たか？

ペイク大尉：アレキサンダー地区のギルマン兵営にいた。

問：日本軍との戦闘経過はどうか？

エリントン中佐：二月八九日に日本軍が東北と西北の二方面から攻撃してきたのであるが、自分達は日本軍から何処から攻撃してくるか判らなかった。戦前西海岸には防御設備はなかったのであり、此処で日本軍に対抗したのは豪州兵と印度兵であり、二日後にはブキテマ高地まで押されてしまったのである。自分達の聯隊は二月十日ブラクからブキテマへ行くよう命令され、わが大隊は十二日夜中までプキテマ附近で防備し待ちこたえていた。十二日になってから日本の兵隊がジャングルを突破し、自分の隊の後方に廻ってくるのを見受けた。これらの日本の兵隊は優秀な兵隊であった。

十三日、ボナビスターまで退却するように命令を受け、その夜アレキサンダーの街道へ後退した。この頃日本軍はブキテマ街道を戦車と歩兵で猛進撃し来った。十四、五の両日わが大隊は日本軍の砲兵と空中から攻撃を受けながらギルマン兵営を防御したのであるが、この戦闘が最も近接して戦ったものであった。

日本軍の猛烈なる攻撃には全く驚嘆した。白兵戦はライトン少佐（第二中隊）とモファット准尉（第三中隊附）とが十四日の夕方まで行ったのであるが、日本の兵隊は銃剣で突き込んでくるのに対し、わが隊は機関銃で対抗し、いくら撃っても日本の兵隊は小さな鬼のようにつぎからつぎと突き込んでくる。これには如何の精巧な機関銃でも駄目だった。日本の兵隊は人間ではないような気持ちがした。この激戦でわが第二、三中隊は僅か数名しか残さずやられてしまった。

自分達の大隊の左翼にマレー人の大隊が居た。これに日本軍が突入し左翼の海に近い方を日本軍が押さえたのである。仕方なく自分は大隊長として次の防備線はワシントン丘に新陣地を占めるよう命令した。これは十五日の午後二時から三時の間であった。夜八時パーシバル将軍から『全員降伏せよ』と命令がきた。翌日、日本軍の将校がきてローヤル聯隊は勇敢であったと讃えていた。

ペイク大尉：一月十四日、セーガーマットで日本軍と遭遇したのが最初であり、爆撃を受けたが戦闘ではなく退却した。この時対峙していた日本軍はゴム林とジャングルを見事に突破し海を通ってわが軍の後に廻ってきたのだ。

エリントン中佐：ムーアとホンベンの間に当るペーアンの戦闘には日本の戦車七台が現れ、歩兵が前進してきた。

ライトン少佐：普通の鉄条網と対戦車地雷で作った戦車障碍を日本の戦車が突破してきたが、交戦はなく、その日のうちに退却した。

モファット准尉：日本軍の行動は全く予想出来ず、後に廻ってくるので、いつも退却していた。日本軍は機動作戦が実に上手だ。

エリントン中佐：シンガポールに退却するまで四〇％の兵を失っていた。二十六日トラックでシンガポールに到着し補充隊として装備を整えていた。

モファット准尉：ジョホールを渡るときは日本軍の姿はまだ見えなかった。

問：シンガポール陥落の時の気持ちはどうだった？

エリントン中佐：降伏の命令を受けたときはビックリした。自分らはこんなことを予期してはいなかった。自分らは全力を尽くして戦ってきたが、命令を受けたから仕方がなかったのだ。

問：シンガポールに日本軍が上陸した報を聴いた時の気持ちは？

エリントン中佐：その時は予期していた。

ペイク大尉：自分達は全部殺されるまで戦う意志をもっていたが、命令を受けたから仕方がない。

問：シンガポール陥落の原因は何処にあると思うか？

エリントン中佐：北の方からの攻撃に対する設備は充分でなかった。シンガポールは南の海に面して防備していたのである。また空軍が非常に貧弱であった。降伏の直接の原因は”住民の死傷と街を壊さぬことことに日本軍が水道を占領していた”ことであり、これはパーシバル将軍の言でもある。

アンカース兵長：日本軍は数的にも優勢であり、空中からの爆撃が上手で自分等は陣地を守るだけだった。

ストレンジ軍曹：自分はギルマン兵営で戦闘中小銃弾が手先に当り負傷した。その時の記念に今でもその弾をもっている。

エリントン中佐：日本軍はジャングル突破などの機動作戦が上手で意表外な所から攻撃してくる。

問：では日本軍はジャングルを突き泥濘を冒し意外な所から攻撃するので非紳士的であるというのか？

エリントン中佐：いやいや、そうではない。自分らの軍隊では”戦争と恋愛とに於いては何をしても正しい”という標語である。日本軍攻撃は優秀である。

問：エリントン隊長が最後に部下に与えた訓示はどんなものか？

エリントン中佐：各中隊毎に武器を積み上げ日本軍の命令を待てと命令し、つぎのメッセージを全員に告げた：「自分は諸君が非常によく戦ったことを喜ぶ。諸君自身のあやまちではなく命令を受けたので降伏する。戦死に当り敗北に際しても義務と規律を示した諸君の戦友を記憶せよ。俘虜となってもローヤル聯隊の名誉を辱めるな」というのである。現在自分達は軍人として日本に対して敵意を持っていない。

モファット准尉：我々一同は日本軍の正遇に感謝している。

【朝鮮軍検閲済み】

Source: https://archive.org/details/kjnp-1943-02-15/mode/1up

Imperial Japan banned passengers wearing chima skirts from boarding trains, escalating its campaign against traditional Korean garments in May 1945

In May 1945, as the war situation worsened, the Japanese colonial authorities in Korea tightened their grip on everyday life in increasingly petty and invasive ways. One striking example was the enforcement of strict wartime attire regulations. As shown in this May 14, 1945 article, colonial authorities began banning travelers from boarding trains if they were not wearing “proper” air-raid clothing, which explicitly targeted traditional Korean garments—especially the flowing chima skirts worn by Korean women.

On May 9, 1945, Keijō Nippō published a photo of the feet of Korean women wearing chima, shaming them by calling such clothing “a suicidal act.” The article warned that the skirts could easily catch fire from incendiary bombs or become soaked with water and render the wearer unable to function in a wartime emergency. The piece concluded by declaring that such a sight was inappropriate for May 8, which was Imperial Rescript Day (Taishō Hōtai-bi).

Imperial Rescript Day was a commemorative day established in 1942 during the Pacific War to boost morale across the Japanese Empire. It replaced the earlier “Asia Promotion Service Day” and designated the 8th of every month as a day for rallying national resolve to complete the war effort. On this day, subjects across the empire were expected to participate in rituals such as reading the imperial war proclamation, offering victory prayers at shrines and temples, and displaying Japanese flags at home.

Apparently, many Koreans mistakenly believed that these harsh clothing inspections applied only on Imperial Rescript Day. This would explain why the number of attire violations dropped sharply on the 8th, only to spike again afterwards. 

The requirement to undergo humiliating attire checks at train stations—particularly the targeting of traditional Korean dress—would have understandably outraged many. In a time of total war, when morale should have been preserved, this kind of petty colonial micromanagement only deepened alienation and anger among the colonized.

Documenting examples like this is important. They show how colonial oppression extended into the minutiae of daily life, even into how people dressed. Far from merely logistical wartime policies, these measures were ideological tools meant to erase Korean identity, impose Japanese norms, and discipline the population into obedience. Remembering and analyzing these acts of everyday repression is not just about historical interest—it is about confronting the full spectrum of colonial violence, including the psychological and cultural forms that often go unacknowledged.

[Translations]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) May 14, 1945

"Prohibited Attire for Boarding Trains"
Many in the Intellectual Class are Caught — One Hundred People Per Day
Sunday Special Inspection Report

Since the fourth of this month, enemy aircraft have launched continuous attacks over the seas of southern Korea. On the twelfth, six enemy flying boats penetrated the region, launching attacks on ships. The Korean peninsula is now effectively a battlefield. It is not out of the question that these enemy planes may escalate from attacks on ships to indiscriminate bombing of cities.

So, how prepared is the Korean peninsula to face this threat? Regrettably, it cannot yet be said that we are in a full wartime posture.

To take a simple example — the air-raid attire of travelers. Despite repeated warnings to the point of exhaustion, a significant number still do not wear maki-kyahan (leg wrappings), or drag long Korean-style garments that sweep the ground. Not a few have even been denied boarding by station staff. It is especially disgraceful when even members of the educated class, who should be setting an example, nonchalantly fail to wear the proper leg wrappings.

To establish a travel posture suitable for decisive battle, the Seoul Regional Bureau has, since the first of this month, prohibited boarding to travelers not in air-raid attire. From the first to the tenth at Seoul Station, 230 travelers were denied boarding.

Here is the breakdown of the numbers of passengers who were denied boarding:

• • Day 1: 12

• • Day 2: 8

• • Day 3: 32

• • Day 4: 26

• • Day 5: 36

• • Day 6: 48

• • Day 7: 39

• • Day 8: 2

• • Day 9: 6

• • Day 10: 21

The eighth was Imperial Rescript Day, so air-raid attire was strictly observed, with only two violations.

The highest number of refusals was on the sixth, with 48 people barred from boarding. If the general mindset is that "air-raid attire is only necessary on Rescript Days," that is a grave mistake. Enemy aircraft can appear at any time. If one can wear air-raid attire on a Rescript Day, one can certainly do so on other days.

Although unfamiliarity might be an excuse in the beginning, under normal circumstances the number of boarding denials should gradually decrease. However, judging from these numbers, there has been no reduction at all — rather, starting from the third, the number has increased, revealing a general indifference toward air-raid readiness.

Of course, the station staff are not eager to refuse boarding. If travelers are properly attired, that is enough. Station personnel issue warnings before the ticket gate to travelers who are not dressed properly. Only those who ignore these warnings are refused boarding as a last resort.

Each day, more than 100 travelers are warned, and at peak times, the number exceeds 200.

• • Day 1: 219

• • Day 2: 216

• • Day 3: 187

• • Day 4: 137

• • Day 5: 126

• • Day 6: 121

• • Day 7: 117

• • Day 8: 49

• • Day 9: 70

• • Day 10: 57

Without the station staff’s compassionate warnings, all these individuals would have been denied boarding outright.

It is utterly shameful that over 100 travelers each day, despite utilizing railways — regarded as weapons of war, must be reprimanded for improper air-raid attire under repeated air raids. Air-raid attire is not for anyone else — it is for the travelers’ own safety.

Travelers must take the current situation more seriously, and rather than wait to be told by station staff, they must proactively ensure proper air-raid attire.

What about the clothing of travelers arriving at Seoul Station? Unfortunately, their attire is just as inappropriate. They are not dressed for wartime travel. Although the emergency policy of “no boarding without air-raid attire” is not limited to Seoul Station but enforced throughout the entire jurisdiction of the regional transportation bureau, arriving passengers should have had their attire inspected at their departure stations.

The fact that their attire is in disarray upon arrival suggests that they shed their air-raid attire after boarding, as if thinking it is only necessary to get past boarding inspections.

This mindset must be corrected immediately. The station has announced that it will further tighten enforcement from now on.

Given the increasing severity of enemy bombing, this policy is entirely appropriate. Travelers themselves must take initiative in wearing proper air-raid clothing. Anyone wearing "unfit-for-battle attire" must be firmly excluded from our valuable wartime trains. Let us establish a decisive travel posture as soon as possible, prepared to face enemy planes at any time.

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) May 9, 1945

Can You Really Be Active Like This?

Do you really think your clothing is appropriate? Do you think you can withstand the enemy’s blind bombings dressed like that? Or is it that you do not own monpe workpants? How many times must we say that wearing chima is an act of suicide before you understand?

When incendiary bombs set your chima on fire, or when your chima becomes soaked with water, you will no longer be able to move, and you will be completely defeated.

Enemy planes may come soon—perhaps even tonight. Just because the weather has become pleasant, do not be foolish enough to think, “I will just try wearing this for a bit.” Get serious.

Even so, we still see girls strutting through the streets indulging in a sense of style, not wearing monpe, but rather sailor-style trousers—pants so fancy that even men do not wear them, once worn by revue girls. This too must stop.

If you must wear pants, tighten the hems. Also, we have seen men who are not wearing leg wrappings. That too must be corrected immediately.

The above are the unfit-for-battle appearances we observed on the Imperial Rescript Day on the 8th in a city that is under attack from frequent enemy air raids. [Photo caption: Could this be you?]

[Transcriptions]

京城日報 1945年5月14日

『乗車禁止の非服装』

多い指導層、一日に百名

日曜紙上査察

去る四日以来敵機は連日わが南鮮海面に来襲しつつある。十二日も敵飛行艇六機が南鮮海面に侵入。船舶に攻撃を加え来った半島もいまや戦場と化し敵機はいつ現在の船舶攻撃から都市の無差別爆撃に出ないとも限らないが、ところがこれに備ゆる半島の態勢はどうか。遺憾ながら、いまだ戦う態勢になりきっているとはない。

早い話が旅行者の防空服装一つをとりあげてみても、あれだけ口がすっぱくなるほど注意されながらいまだに巻脚絆をつけない者、すその長い鮮服をひきずっている者が相当数に上り、駅員から乗車を拒絶された旅行者も少なくない。殊に率先垂範すべき知識階級までが平然と脚絆をつけないでいるのはもっての外だ。

旅行の決戦態勢化を期する京城地方局では去る一日から防空服装以外の旅行者は乗車を禁止しているが、京城駅で一日から十日までに乗車禁止にあった旅行者は二百三十名に上っている。

内訳は初日の一日が十二名、二日が八名、三日が三十二名、四日が二十六名、五日が三十六名、六日が四十八名、七日が三十九名、八日が二名、九日が六名、十日が二十一名となっており、流石に八日は大詔奉戴日だけに防空服装が徹底していて禁止は僅か二名に過ぎない。

一番多いのは六日で実に四十八名が乗車を禁止されているが、一般が『防空服装は大詔奉戴日だけ』といった考えでいるとしたら大変な間違いだ。敵機はいつやって来ないとも限らないし、大詔奉戴日に防空服装が出来て他の日に出来ない筈もない。しかも最初は周知不十分ということも考えられ、本来なら漸次乗車禁止が減少する筈であるが、この数字からみると一向減少しておらず、反対に初日は少なく三日から増加している状態で、防空服装に対する一般の冷淡さをはっきりと窺うことが出来るのである。

無論、駅では乗車拒絶が本意ではない。旅行者の防空服装が整えばそれでよく、だからとくに改札前防空服装を整えていない旅行者には注意を与えており、乗車拒絶はそれでも聞かない不埒者に最後の切札として断行しているのである。

この注意を与える旅行者数をみると、これは毎日百名を下らず、多い時には実に二百名を越している。まず初日の一日が二百十九名、二日が二百十六名、三日が百八十七名、四日が百三十七名、五日が百二十六名、六日が百二十一名、七日が百十七名、八日が四十九名、九日が七十名、十日が五十七名であり、駅側のこの思いやりの注意がなければ毎日これだけの旅行者が乗車禁止になっているわけだ。

敵機連襲下に、しかも兵器といわれる鉄道を利用する旅行者が毎日百名以上も防空服装のことで駅員から注意されるのは恥辱も甚だしい。防空服装は誰のためでもない。旅行者自身のためであり、もっと真剣に時局を見つめ、寧ろ駅側からいわれる前に旅行者自ら進んで防空服装の徹底を期せねばならない。

一方京城駅に降りて来る旅行者の服装はどうか。これも乗車する旅行者と変わらず、まだまだ戦う服装になりきっていない。防空服装以外は乗車禁止の非常措置はひとり京城駅ばかりでなく、地方交通局管内全部にわたって断行されているのだし、降車客は発駅で乗車の際、一応服装を点検された筈であるが、それでいて降車の際の服装が乱れているのは旅行者が乗車してしまえば防空服装の必要なく、防空服装は乗車するためのものといった考えでいるからだ。

この考えは絶対切り換えねばならない。駅側では今後ますますこの取締を厳重にするといっている。

敵機の爆撃がいよいよ本格化しつつあるとき当然と措置であり、旅行者としても進んで防空服装を整えるよう心掛け、そして貴重な戦う列車からは断然『戦わざる服装』を締出し敵機いつでも来いの決戦旅行態勢を一日も速やかに確立することが望ましい。

京城日報 1945年5月9日

これで活動ができますか

貴女方の服装はそれでよいと思うのですか。それで敵の盲爆に戦い抜けるとでもお思いですか。それともモンペを持っていないのですか。チマのままでは自殺行為だと何度いえばわかるのです。焼夷弾でチマに火がついたとき、またはチマが水に濡れたときは活動が出来ず、あなた方は完全に負けるのです。

敵機は今に、いや今夜でも来るかも判らない季節が陽気になったから、ちょっと着て見ようなどという馬鹿気た心は起さないで真剣になりましょう。それなのにまたモンペでなくレビューガールが履いていた男も履けないセーラズボンにシャレ気分を満喫し街を闊歩する娘を見かけるが、これも止めましょう。ズボンなら裾をしぼりましょう。なお男も脚絆を着用しないのを見受けたが即刻改めましょう。以上敵機しきりに来襲する八日の奉戴日に戦う街で見受けた戦はない姿です。

【写真＝あなたの姿はここにないか】

Source: National Library of Korea, Digital Newspaper Archive

See Also:

Link 1 (1943 clothing regulations regarding chima dresses): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2022/11/onerous-regulations-prescribing-long.html

Link 2 (1944 police detaining a woman in Hanbok dress): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2024/12/korean-woman-in-hanbok-detained-by.html

Link 3 (1945 propaganda speech forbidding rings and chima dresses at work): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2025/04/dont-wear-rings-or-chima-dresses-dont.html

Link 4 (April 1945 poster shaming Korean women for wearing chima skirts): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2025/05/imperial-japan-called-korean-women-in.html

“If Japan loses, Koreans will fight each other, divided by foreign powers”: June 1945 warning by Korean collaborator (박춘금, 朴春琴) who urged authorities to redirect Korean nationalism into support for Imperial Japan

This is a translation of a Japanese newspaper roundtable discussion from June 1945, held just two months before Imperial Japan’s defeat in World War II. The participants included senior Japanese officials—an army major general, colonial administrators, and publishing executives—as well as Park Chun-geum, a prominent Korean collaborator and former parliamentarian who was highly trusted by the colonial regime.

Despite his reputation, Park offers an unusually lucid view into the mindset of Koreans at the time. He had spoken directly with Korean youth who feared that if Imperial Japan lost, the peninsula would descend into chaos. Multiple foreign powers—the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Nationalists (Chongqing), and pro-Japanese factions—would all try to assert control. Park warns that Koreans would end up fighting each other, and that the only way to prevent this disaster was for Imperial Japan to trust Koreans, give them hope, and reframe the war as a defense of Korea itself.

Park was essentially calling for a redirection of Korean nationalism—not its suppression—toward protecting the homeland by fighting under the Imperial Japanese banner.

But the Japanese participants could not comprehend this, and ignored Park's concerns. They refused to leave their own reality bubble, insisting upon maintaining the ideology of naisen ittai (內鮮一體, Japanese-Korean Unification), which was fundamentally incompatible with permitting Korean nationalism. This meeting is a striking case of hypernormalization—a regime clinging to its official ideology and pretending that business as usual could continue, even as the empire was disintegrating.

What makes this article especially remarkable is that it was published during the final phase of the Battle of Okinawa, with the clear possibility that the Korean peninsula itself could soon become a battlefield. For years, propaganda had vaguely warned that “we will become slaves” if Imperial Japan lost—but here, for the first time, you see detailed, realistic predictions: a fragmented, occupied Korea and internecine warfare. That level of candor—speculation on Imperial Japan’s defeat and Korea’s postwar future—appearing in a Japanese newspaper in 1945 is extraordinary.

Even more striking, the article predicts that Soviet forces would enter Korea, despite the USSR not yet being at war with Imperial Japan at the time. The only real inaccuracy is the assumption that the Chinese Nationalists (referred to as "Chongqing" after their capital) would prevail in China’s civil war. Otherwise, the forecast is hauntingly accurate.

The roundtable also touches on the organization of Korean Volunteer Corps, intended to mobilize civilians—even girls as young as 12—into makeshift militias similar to Germany’s Volkssturm. At this stage in the war, Japanese authorities were already training some Koreans with bamboo spears, preparing them for suicidal banzai charges against Allied forces.

In short, this roundtable reveals a desperate colonial regime completely out of touch with the sentiment of the Korean people, refusing to accept reality, and still insisting on ideological unity while the empire’s collapse was imminent.

[Translation]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) June 1, 1945

Expectations for the National Volunteer Corps
(Roundtable hosted by Keijo Nippo newspaper, Part 4)
Resolving Ideological Problems
Instill Political Ideals!

Mr. Park Chun-geum (박춘금, 朴春琴) (former member of the Diet): Until recently, I did not understand the feelings of the Korean youth. However, I sensed something lately and gathered some young people together. I asked them: “What do you think will happen to the Korean peninsula if Japan loses the war? And what will happen if Japan wins?” I asked them to speak frankly. They responded with something interesting:

“If Japan loses, five or six different forces will come into the Korean peninsula—such as the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the Chongqing government, and pro-Japanese elements—splitting into factions and fighting among themselves. The 26 million people on the Korean peninsula will end up killing each other. That would bring the greatest misfortune to the Korean people. Therefore, we hope the Japanese people will fully trust the Koreans and allow us to contribute as well. We would like you, Chun-geum, to convey this message.”

Thus, I believe it is necessary to fully grasp the spirit of the youth. To achieve this, we must provide hope to the Korean people. Up until now, they have been told endlessly to become loyal subjects of the Empire. What is needed now is to give them hope. Entrust the structure of the national body to the Korean people and say, “You can do it. The peninsula is your homeland.”

In short, what is most important at this moment is that the Japanese people sincerely trust the Koreans and give them hope and a sense of cooperation. If we do that, the Korean people will gladly give their lives as Imperial subjects. Also, we must genuinely demonstrate that the motivation behind the Greater East Asia War is the liberation of the peoples of Asia.

I would like to see this kind of roundtable held once more, and with a broader range of participants. I believe it would be extremely effective in stimulating public opinion and providing useful guidance to the authorities.

Mr. Kurashige Shūzō (Imperial Army Major General, Secretary General of the Korea Headquarters of the Patriotic Women's Association): On the 14th, Prime Minister Suzuki clarified the operational policy of the National Volunteer Corps, stating that the Corps’ essential mission is to embody ethical principles and serve the nation.

I have always believed that the foundation of national governance lies in clarifying the national body and rectifying moral principles in order to carry out the war to its conclusion. From this perspective, I believe the National Volunteer Corps should become a central element of current political efforts.

Accordingly, in organizing this system, the government must ensure that its principles are thoroughly understood by the officials directly involved—the heads of provinces, districts (gun), prefectures, towns (eup), and townships (myeon).

Mr. Ishida Kōzō (President of Jinmonsha Publishing): Leaders should be chosen from among the local bosses with real political capability. Ultimately, without political skill, the endeavor will likely fail.

In any undertaking, I believe it is more effective when politically aware people are involved. Organizing a volunteer corps of 26 million requires instilling a political ideal. In order to instill a lofty ideal, political awareness is necessary.

Mr. Park: This is not a time to discuss the grand plans of a hundred years. What matters now is winning the war. To that end, we must secure even greater cooperation from the Korean people. That means giving them hope.

Mr. Matsumura Kōichi (Executive at Korean Aircraft Company, Director at the Ministry of Culture and Information): From what I have heard, two main issues have been raised. One is the matter of political awareness. To be clear, this is an ideological issue. In Korea, a national movement cannot be launched unless the ideological issues are resolved.

Therefore, if a National Volunteer Corps is to be created, we must resolve ideological problems to a certain degree, or else it will be ineffective. I believe no one would disagree with this.

The most solid method would be to resolve these ideological issues and then build the National Volunteer Corps with mainland Japanese at its core and Koreans supporting it.

Mr. Ishida: I fully agree with the first part of what you said. There is no alternative but to resolve Korea’s ideological issues before moving forward.

As for the lingering, unresolved ideological discontent that remains today, I believe it can only be resolved through something like the Volunteer Corps—something combat-oriented. This applies equally to both mainland Japan and Korea. There are unique elements to the complexity of Korea’s ideological issues.

Mr. Matsumura: There is a large qualitative difference between the Korean Volunteer Corps and that of mainland Japan. As for the ideological question, how can it be resolved? If mainland Japan fully trusts the Korean side, and the Korean side fully trusts mainland Japan, then it can be resolved. Achieving that trust will only be possible by fighting the war together. In organizing the Volunteer Corps, I believe Korea’s unique characteristics will naturally emerge.

Mr. Kurashige: The ideological issue is a difficult one, but in our Patriotic Women's Association, for example, when we gather and talk a few times, no real problems arise.

In other words, mutual understanding leads to resolution. If we develop close relationships with each other, we will understand one another. In that case, the concept of Japanese-Korean unification becomes a non-issue.

Mr. Yokomizo (President of Keijo Nippo newspaper): We are truly honored to have gathered you all here today—individuals with rich experience, deep insight, and aspirations regarding the national movement—to provide frank and unreserved opinions about the organization of the National Volunteer Corps.

For our newspaper, which bears the serious responsibility of guiding public opinion, today’s discussion was highly informative. Above all, all policy measures today must focus on winning this war. Therefore, even if a new structure for the National Volunteer Corps is established, it must ultimately aim to achieve maximum effectiveness for victory. All specific strategies must therefore be directed toward this objective.

(End)

[Transcription]

京城日報 1945年6月1日

国民義勇隊に期待する（本社主催座談会４）
思想問題の解決
政治的理念を持たせよ

朴春琴氏（元代議士）：私は此の頃の半島青年の気持というものを知らなかった。ところが最近感ずるところがあって青年を集めて私は大体こういうことをいった。『日本が戦に負けたら半島の運命はどうなるか。それから日本が戦に勝ったら朝鮮の運命はどうか』、こういうことで忌憚なく話してくれといった。すると面白いことをいっていた。『日本が負ければ今度は半島には五つも六つもの勢力が入って来る。例えば米英とかソ連とか重慶とか或は親日とかそういうような分子に分れてお互いに闘争する。そうすると二千六百万がお互いに殺しっこをやる。こうなったら半島人は最も大いなる不幸に陥る。故に我々はこう考える日本人が全面的に朝鮮人を信頼して我々にも働かせて貰いたい。そのことを春琴さんから話してくれ』、とそういうことをいっていた。

そこで青年達の魂というものを相当掴む必要があると思う。それがためには何とか半島人に希望を与えなくてはならぬ。今まで単に、お前たちは皇国臣民になれということを耳にタコが出来る程いわれている。そこで希望を与えることだ。今度の国体も半島人に委してお前達がやるのだ。半島はお前達の郷里だという風にやる。何といってもこの際は内地人が大きな気持で半島人を信頼して希望を持たして協力せよというならば、半島人は喜んで皇国臣民として命も捨てる気になる。そして日本民族が大東亜戦争を起した動機はアジア民族の解放にあるのだということを本当に示してやる。

今日のような会をもう一回やってほしい。そして出席者の範囲をもっと広くしてやってほしい。そしたら当局の参考に与論の振起に非常に効果があると思う。

倉茂周蔵氏（陸軍少将、日婦朝鮮本部事務総長）：十四日に鈴木首相は国民義勇隊の運営方針を明らかにされたが、国民義勇隊員は道義をもって国民を貫くことをもって本義と致すものであるといわれた。私は国政の基本は国体を明かにし名分を正し、もって戦争を完遂するにあると常々考えているのであるが、この国民義勇隊はこの意味から申しても今日の政治の要点になるべきものであると思う。

従ってこの組織に当っては政府側においても直接その衝に当る道、郡、府、邑、面、等の長に対してよく其の趣旨を徹底せしめられたい。

石田耕造氏（人文社社長）：指導者は一地方の親分で政治的能力のある人物を選ぶがよい。要するに政治的能力乃至手腕の少ない人はどうもうまく行かないのではないかと思う。何事にもこの運動の展開には政治性を持つ方が効果がありはしないかと思う。二千六百万で義勇隊を組織するということは矢張りそこに政治的理念を持たせる方がよいのではないか。高い理念を持たせるには結局政治性を持たせなくてはならんと思う。

朴氏：百年の大計を今日論ずるのではない。勝てばよいのである。それがためには半島人として一層協力せしむることである。それには希望を与えることが必要であると思う。

松村紘一氏（朝鮮飛行機重役、文報理事）：色々お話を承ったが、要するに問題は二つ提出されていると思う。政治性という問題、これをハッキリ申し上げると思想問題であって結局朝鮮では国民運動は思想問題を解決してからでないと出来ない訳だから、国民義勇隊をつくるならば思想問題にある程度解決を与えないと実効がない。これは何人も異存のないことと思う。そこでこの思想問題を解決して国民義勇隊というものを内地人を中心にしてつくり半島人の方でついていくという方法が一番堅実ではないかと思う。

石田氏：只今のお話の前半には全く賛成である。朝鮮の思想問題を解決して然る後にやる外ないと思う。

今日なお残っている釈然たらざる思想的不満は何によって解決するかということ、これは義勇隊的なそういう戦闘的なものでないと解決出来ないと思う。これは内地側においても朝鮮側においても同じである。朝鮮の思想問題の難しさは独特のものがあると思う。

松村氏：朝鮮の義勇隊と内地側とでは非常に質的に差異があると思う。それから思想問題だが、これをどういう方法で解決するかといえば、内地側は朝鮮側を全面的に信頼し、朝鮮側は内地側を全面的に信頼すれば解決する訳である。これをやることは一緒に戦争をやる外はないと思う。義勇隊組織ということについては朝鮮の特性というものが現れて来ると思う。

倉茂氏：思想問題ということについては難しい問題だが私の方の婦人会等でも二三回集って話をすると結局何も問題は起こらない。つまりよく諒解し合うからである。お互いに親しくすればよく判ることで内鮮一体も何もないと思う。

横溝社長：国民運動について豊富な御経験、御識見また御抱負をもっていられる皆さん方のお集まりを戴き当面の国民義勇隊の組織に関して、最も忌憚のない批判を仰ぎましたことは私共の誠にしあわせとするところです。

与論指導に重大使命を持っている本社としては大変よい参考と相なった訳です。何といっても今日のすべての施策はこの戦争に戦い勝つということに集中しなければならぬ。

この故に、将来つくられる国民義勇隊の新機構といっても結局は勝つために最大の効率を発揮させなければならないのである。従ってそれぞれの具体的な方策はこの目標に集中せられることと思う（終り）。

Source: National Library of Korea, Digital Newspaper Archive

Imperial Japan called Korean women in chima dresses ‘the most filthy and ugly sight’ and shamed them with posters captioned ‘there are still women like these’ (April 1945)

In April 1945, with Imperial Japan losing the war, Imperial authorities turned their rage inward.

Captioned poster: "There are still women like these" (まだいる、こんな女性が)

Imperial authorities targeted Korean women for wearing traditional chima skirts instead of wartime monpe trousers. The Battle of Iwo Jima had just ended, and Battle of Okinawa was already well underway, so war tensions were very high. These two articles, published in the Keijo Nippo propaganda newspaper in Seoul under Imperial Japanese rule, scolded Korean women as selfish, vain, and unpatriotic, claiming that women in traditional chima dresses were “the most filthy and ugly sight” in the eyes of the public. 

[Translation]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) April 21, 1945

You Cannot Protect This Nation Wearing a Chima Dress

What is this? Have you forgotten the enemy air raids, just strolling around idly?
There are still women like this.

◇ …Dragging their long chima hems, letting their skirts flutter in the spring breeze—how the number of high heels strutting through this city at war has grown! The long winter has passed, cherry buds are swelling on the trees, and now, with the arrival of spring, the slackening of wartime tension has begun to creep into people's hearts. Here and there, women can be seen on the streets who have forgotten their monpe workpants.

◇ …Do these women really think that, dressed like that, they can protect themselves from enemy bombings, protect their homes, and protect their cities? These women dragging their long chima hems have children who go off to school wearing gallant monpe and kyahan leg wraps. These women wearing skirts, whose footsteps echo in the streets in high heels, have brothers who are throwing their lives into battle in factories and on the front lines. Surely these women have not forgotten about that?

◇ …And yet, are these women the only ones allowed to dress like this? Even they cannot say that they do not have enough thread to alter a skirt or chima dress into monpe workpants. If they are clinging to outdated lifestyle habits, then those are the habits of a defeated people. If there are any people who believe that chima dresses and skirts symbolize feminine beauty, then they are gravely mistaken. The people walking the streets see their appearance as the most shameful and unsightly thing, and they look upon them with eyes of reproach.

◇ …It may be April, when spring flowers bloom, but right now, as the decisive battle that will determine the fate of the Japanese people begins, we are living in an autumn of resolve, with all 100 million ready to fall like cherry blossoms in a special attack. Skirts and chima dresses not altered into monpe workpants should be stored away with your evacuation clothing. Let us prepare for the enemy planes that may come even tomorrow, and demonstrate the spirit of the Yamato Nadeshiko in monpe workpants that will not hinder our movement. [Photo: Observations from within Seoul on the 20th during defense drills]

Original caption: Observations from within Seoul on the 20th during defense drills

If You Let Your Guard Down, It Will Cost You!

Secretary-General Kurashige of the Patriotic Women’s Association Issues a Warning About Chima Dresses

During the defense drills held on the 20th, the unsightly sight of women in chima drew widespread scorn. Secretary-General Kurashige of the Patriotic Women’s Association’s Korean Headquarters, issued the following call to awaken women regarding proper air defense attire:

“Because the air raids in Osaka temporarily eased, people became completely careless and stopped wearing monpe. The damage caused by the air raids that struck during this lapse was severe. This is a classic example of what happens when there is no mental discipline.

We Korean women must not repeat this mistake. We must begin with the simple act of wearing monpe pants and throw ourselves into a wartime way of life.

I cannot stop urging the women supporting the home front to awaken!”

[Transcription]

京城日報 1945年4月21日

チマでは護れぬ
何事ぞ、敵襲忘れてノタリノタリ
まだいる、こんな女性が

◇．．．裾長にチマを引き、春風にスカートをなぶらせて戦う街をゆくハイヒールの何と殖えたことであろうか。永かった冬も去り桜の枝頭もふくらむ春とともに戦う人の心の間隙に喰いこむ緊張のゆるみからモンペを忘れた女性が街々に散見される。

◇．．．いったい貴女はそれで敵の爆撃から身を護り、家を都市を護り抜けると思っているのでしょうか。チマの裾を引いた貴女の子供は巻脚絆にモンペの凛々しい姿で学校へ通っている。スカートにハイヒールの音も高く街を闊歩する貴女の兄さんや弟たちは工場で戦場で生命を投げ出して戦っていることをよもや忘れてる訳ではないでしょう。

◇．．．それなのに貴女だけがその姿でよいのでしょうか。スカートやチマをモンペに直す位の糸がないとはいくら貴女でもいえますまい。もしも生活の習慣に固執されるのだったら、それは敗戦国民の習慣です。万一チマやスカートが女性美を象徴するものだと思ってる人があったら大間違い。街ゆく人々は貴女達の姿を最も穢れた醜いものとして非難の眼で見ているのですぞ。

◇．．．花開く春四月だが、いまや日本民族の興亡を決する大決戦は咲く花とともに桜花と散らん一億特攻の決意に生きる秋なのです。モンペに直さぬチマやスカート類は疎開衣料のなかに入れて、さあ明日にも来る敵機に備え、活動に支障のないモンペ姿に大和撫子の心意気を示そうではありませんか。

【写真＝防衛演習の二十日府内所見】

油断するな
倉茂日婦総長
チマに警告

防衛演習の二十日、見苦しいチマ姿が一般の顰蹙をかった。日婦朝鮮本部倉茂事務総長はこの日婦人の防空服装に次の如く覚醒を促した。

大阪で一時空襲がゆるやかになったため、すっかり油断してモンペを着なくなった。この時に乗じて受けた空襲の被害は大きかったという。これは心のひきしまりがない時の好例だが、われわれ半島女性はこの轍を踏まないように簡単なモンペ着用から始めて戦う生活に奮闘せねばならない。銃後女性の覚醒を促してやまない。

Source: National Library of Korea, Digital Newspaper Archive

See Also:

Link 1 (1943 clothing regulations regarding chima dresses): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2022/11/onerous-regulations-prescribing-long.html

Link 2 (1944 police detaining a woman in Hanbok dress): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2024/12/korean-woman-in-hanbok-detained-by.html

Link 3 (1945 propaganda speech forbidding rings and chima dresses at work): https://tpjv86b.blogspot.com/2025/04/dont-wear-rings-or-chima-dresses-dont.html

Imperial Japan shamed Koreans for going to theaters instead of preparing for invasion (March 1945)

As Imperial Japan’s war effort crumbled in early 1945, its propaganda turned increasingly desperate and moralistic. This article, published in March 1945 in Seoul, lashes out at Korean civilians for lining up to see a play, accusing them of betraying the national spirit at a time when Japanese soldiers were dying en masse on Iwo Jima. The piece demands that people forgo leisure, dig trenches, and prepare for the looming American invasion. It also criticizes theater groups for chasing profits instead of bringing morale-boosting performances to soldiers "production warriors" in factories, mines, and rural areas. This highlights how Korean entertainers, such as dancer Choi Seung-hee, were required to perform for the Imperial Army. What stands out is not just the guilt-tripping, but how directly it scolds colonial Koreans as if they were expected to share in Japan’s imperial death cult. Movie theaters throughout Korea would subsequently close, not to reopen until after the war.

I translated the full article below.

[Translation]

Gyeongseong Ilbo (Keijo Nippo) March 26, 1945

Have You Forgotten Your Outrage, Masses?
Entertainment must be in step with the times

Following the news that all soldiers on Iwo Jima had died charging into the enemy, the announcement of the Divine Tide Special Attack Units stirred the blood of the 26 million residents of the Korean Peninsula. “Strike and do not stop!”—biting down, chewing on grass roots if necessary—we swore to fight to the end. Surely, you felt that burning spirit surge through your very being.

Yet some people in Seoul are acting disgracefully. Though the theater was scheduled to open at 1 p.m., people began crowding in front of the Bumingwan Hall from around 8 a.m., desperate to see a play. Elbowing and shoving each other—this vulgar spectacle—is this acceptable? We want to shout at the top of our lungs: Is this really acceptable?

Yes, one might say that spending a day at the theater is understandable, given the lack of entertainment on the home front. But no! The proper time to seek amusement should be determined by the common sense of the people themselves.

Even if the play is enlightening or educational, it is utterly unacceptable from a national moral standpoint to be scrambling for tickets and pushing through crowds to see a performance while listening to the radio report on the Iwo Jima charge, a report that claws at the chests of 100 million people.

No one dies from not watching a play. But if the people grow complacent for even a single moment now, Greater East Asia will be ravaged by the venomous fangs of our enemy America. The phrase "stab the enemy to death with a bamboo spear from within a dugout" is not an exaggeration or a rhetorical flourish. It is the grim reality now at our doorstep.

If you have time to see a play, dig a trench. Evacuate your clothing and tableware. Contribute to the preparation of bomb shelters. Spending two or three hours jostling in front of a theater out of a craving for theater performances is unacceptable behavior in a time when the home front demands the very soul of the Special Attack Unit spirit. Citizens of Seoul, awaken from the depths of your conscience!

We also demand that performers reflect seriously. They must clearly understand the mission of theater in wartime. In the past, performances for the comfort of production warriors toured around visiting every region, but it would be fortunate if these were not simply patchwork measures to dodge criticism from authorities and informed citizens. If theater people are truly awakened to contributing to the war effort, then they should perform in rural farming and fishing villages, mines, and factories—rarely performing in cities, only a few times per year. Let them break free of profit-driven motives.

Furthermore, we must address the organizer—the Seoul City Social Welfare Association. They claim that proceeds go toward welfare work. But if the essence of relief work is the spiritual rehabilitation of the people, then how can they justify stirring up crowds into a ticket-buying frenzy and drowning out the solemnity of the day following news of the Iwo Jima charge? That is not spiritual rehabilitation, but moral confusion which is pushing citizens in exactly the wrong direction.

On a day of such grave national announcements, performances must be canceled immediately. Canceling them becomes a noble opportunity for many people to reflect and contributes more truly to spiritual rehabilitation. To say that doing anything to obtain funds is permissible as long as it is for social welfare is a fallacy.

Now more than ever, everything must be done in line with wartime ethics. Everything must be morally sound and in harmony with the national situation. Yet ironically, at this very theater, it was the venue staff—hired by a "social welfare" group—who had to swing whips to drive back the crowd as it surged forward.

[Photo caption: Is your face among this crowd?]

[Transcription]

京城日報 1945年3月26日

憤激忘れたれ群像
娯楽も時を弁えよ

硫黄島全員斬込みの報につづく神潮特攻隊の公表され、半島二千六百万の血はたぎりたった。撃ちてしやまむ歯を喰いしばって、草の根をかじって、撃ちてしやまむ、この熾烈な戦意が身内に逆流するのをおぼえたにちがいない。ところが、京城府民の一部には開館は一時からだというのに朝の八時頃から芝居を見たさに死にもの狂いになって府民館の前に押し合いへし合う非時局人がいる。この醜態はどうだ。これでよいのか。声を大にしてこれでよいのかと叱咤したい。

娯楽の乏しい銃後の一日を観劇に過ごす、だれに聞かせても一応納得できることではある。だがしかし、娯楽を求める『時』というものは自ら国民の常識によって判断すべきである。

硫黄島斬込みの一億の胸をかきむしる放送を耳にしながらいかに啓蒙的演劇であっても芝居を見る為にごったかえして入場を争うのは国民倫理として絶対許さるべきではない。芝居をみなくても死にはしない。しかしいまの一瞬を国民が懈怠すれば、大東亜が敵アメリカの毒牙に荒される。穴にもぐって竹槍をもって敵を刺殺するというのは誇張でも修辞でもない。目の前に迫った現実なのだ。

芝居を見る暇があったら穴を掘れ。衣類、食器の疎開をせよ。待避壕の整備に努力すべきだ。芝居をみたさに二時間も三時間も劇場の前にごったかえすことは、銃後に特攻魂の強く希求されている今日起り得べき事柄ではない。府民よ、肚の底から自覚せよ。

更に演劇人に反省を求めたいのは、戦時下の演劇の使命をもっとはっきり把握して貰いたいことである。従来も増産戦士慰問は各地域を巡回してやっていたが、これが当局並に識者の鋭い批判の目を逃れるための彌縫策でなければ幸い、もし真に演劇人にして時局に寄与することに目ざめたならば、都会では一年の内数回しか興行せず重点を農漁村、鉱山、工場方面に利潤追求から脱却した演劇人の覚醒も望まれる。

更に主催者側である京城府社会事業協会に敢えて一言社会事業一部に充てるための興行であるそうだが、救済事業の本質が精神的更生にあるとすれば、硫黄島斬り込みの報を耳にし、厳粛な一日を送らんとする府民を、切符買いに狂奔せしめ混雑にまぎれて厳粛さを忘れ去るようなことは銃後の精神を錯乱に陥れる。精神的更生が府民を逆な方面に追いやっているではないか。

このような崇厳な発表のあった場合は直ちに興行をやめるべきだ。やめることがより多くの人たちの反省の貴い資となり精神更生のためになることを知るべきである。社会事業のためなら何をして基金を得てもよいという道理はない。

あくまでも時局的に、どこまでも道義的でなければならぬこと他よりも一層である。しかも整理員が鞭をふり廻して殺到する観衆を追いはらっていたのは、主催者が社会事業協会であっただけに、何かしら皮肉なものを感じさせた。【写真＝この群集の中に君の顔はないか】

Source: National Library of Korea, Digital Newspaper Archive